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PRO-RATA APPORTIONMENT IN  
“LONG-TAIL” CONTAMINATION CASES:  
WILL PRESUMED EFFICIENCIES UNDERCUT 
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUPS? 
BENJAMIN S. REILLY* 
Abstract: Environmental contamination often causes injuries that occur over 
long periods of time. These “long-tail” injuries, which tend to span periods dur-
ing which a liable party was covered by multiple insurers, do not map neatly onto 
standard indemnification insurance policies. As a result, liable parties and their 
insurers frequently engage in protracted litigation to minimize the portion that 
they must contribute to environmental remediation projects. In Boston Gas Co. v. 
Century Indemnity, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld an ap-
plication of Massachusetts’s recently announced pro rata apportionment rule, 
which greatly reduced the insurer’s liability. Proponents of pro rata apportion-
ment argue that it lessens the burden that indemnification litigation puts on court 
dockets and that it promotes environmentally conscientious business practices. 
This Comment challenges those claims and argues that pro rata apportionment 
may actually undermine environmental remediation projects by limiting the 
amount of private resources available for them. 
INTRODUCTION 
Two miles south of downtown Boston sits Rainbow Swash, the world’s 
largest copyrighted art object.1 Since 1971, the Swash, featuring colorful ab-
stract streaks adorning a 150-foot tall gas tank, has been a familiar landmark to 
commuters and others who regularly drive the stretch of I-93 that runs through 
the neighborhood of Dorchester.2 The Boston Gas Company (“Boston Gas”) 
commissioned the artwork on its tank to “symbolize[] the vitality of a compa-
ny which shares both a proud history and an exciting future with the communi-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014. 
 1 Phillip Martin, Wartime Visions—Boston’s Famed Rainbow Tank Inspires Admiration, Scorn, 
NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Nov. 3, 2001), http://www.npr.org/news/specials/response/home_front/
features/2001/nov/rainbowtank/011105.rainbowtank.html, available at http://perma.cc/6VLD-RL6S; 
Rainbow Swash by Corita Kent, CELEBRATE BOSTON, http://www.celebrateboston.com/strange/
rainbow-swash.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/U77R-QR6J. 
 2 Press Release, Boston Gas, Bostongas News (Sept. 27, 1971), available at http://simson.
net/ref/1995/Boston_Gas_History.pdf and http://perma.cc/FJY2-ATUY; Rainbow Swash by Corita 
Kent, supra note 1. 
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ties it serves.”3 National Grid, an international utility conglomerate, now owns 
Boston Gas, the Rainbow Swash, and the land on which it sits (“Commercial 
Point”).4 In the past several years, National Grid has built a substantial solar 
power generation project at Commercial Point.5 Ironically, six acres of clean-
energy producing solar panels now sit directly adjacent to the icon of fossil 
fuel usage.6 
The solar panel installation was developed at Commercial Point partly 
because the land there is significantly contaminated.7 Boston Gas’s operation 
of a manufactured gas plant (“MGP”) is responsible for the site’s toxic state.8 
Manufactured gas, the precursor to natural gas, was widely used in homes and 
businesses throughout the United States during the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century,9 and Boston Gas operated MGPs throughout New England.10 
Rendering gas fuel produces a number of carcinogenic byproducts, which now 
contaminate the land and water in the vicinity of many former MGP sites.11 
The remediation of former MGP sites is a costly process.12 Generally, those 
liable for the costs of remediation look to their insurers to cover those costs.13 
MGPs, however, frequently create injuries that occur over long periods of 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Press Release, Boston Gas, supra note 2. 
 4 Boston Gas was originally a subsidiary of Eastern Enterprises. Eastern Enterprises History, 
FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/eastern-enterprises-history/ 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/ANR7-J5XD. Eastern Enterprises was ac-
quired by KeySpan in 1999. Allanna Sullivan, KeySpan Signs a Pact to Acquire Eastern Enterprises 
for $1.7 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 1999), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB941734317670106579.
html, available at http://perma.cc/4TMW-5T84. KeySpan was then acquired by National Grid in 
2007. Press Release, Nat’l Grid, Boston’s Landmark Gas Tank on Southeast Expressway to Get Name 
Change as KeySpan Transitions to National Grid (Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://goo.gl/1mdcPd 
and http://perma.cc/KSR8-GEQ7. 
 5 Dorchester Solar Power Project, NAT’L GRID, http://www.nationalgridus.com/masselectric/
solar/dorchester.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2013); National Grid Solar, NAT’L GRID, http://www.
nationalgridus.com/masselectric/solar/index.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://
perma.cc/AKQ7-KR9U. 
 6 Dorchester Solar Power Project, supra note 5. 
 7 See id. (noting that the site’s contamination limits the potential for reuse by humans but makes it 
an ideal location for a solar power installation). 
 8 Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co. (Boston Gas Commercial Point II), 708 F.3d 254, 257 
(1st Cir. 2013). 
 9 General Information About MGPs, N.Y. ST. DEPT. OF ENVTL. CONSERV., http://www.dec.
ny.gov/chemical/24911.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/D9SM-KZ97. 
 10 See Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co. (Boston Gas Everett II), 529 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 
2008) (noting that prior to New England’s transition to natural gas use, Boston Gas operated twenty-
nine MGPs). 
 11 Id. 
 12 See Boston Gas Commercial Point II, 708 F.3d at 257–58 (remediation costs of two sites to-
taled nearly $8 million). 
 13 See Joren S. Bass, The Montrose Decision and Long-Tail Environmental Liability: A New Ap-
proach to Allocating Risk Among Multiple Third-Party Insurers, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 209, 209, 211 (1999) (noting that general liability insurance policies serve an important means 
of paying for environmental cleanup projects). 
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time, known as “progressive injuries” or “long-tail injuries.”14 Many times, 
progressive environmental injuries occur over periods during which a liable 
party was insured under several different policies.15 Unsurprisingly, when there 
is a question as to when an environmental harm occurred, those who may be 
liable for costs of the recovery have an incentive to prove that the injury oc-
curred outside the temporal scope of their insurance policy.16 This incentive 
often leads to costly, protracted litigation.17 
Furthermore, when multiple insurers are present during the lifetime of a 
progressive environmental injury, allocating liability to the different policies 
can be “scientifically and administratively impossible.”18 When it is impossi-
ble to determine the proportion of damage that occurred during each policy 
period, the law allocates liability among the insurers.19 In Boston Gas Co. v. 
Century Indemnity (Boston Gas Everett III), in the context of a dispute over the 
cleanup costs of a former Boston Gas MGP site, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court (SJC) in 2009 clarified Massachusetts’s law on allocation and 
adopted the pro-rata approach in the context of long-tail environmental inju-
ries.20 In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, while hearing an 
appeal of an application of the pro-rata approach, affirmed the district court in 
Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indemnity (Boston Gas Commercial Point II).21 
This Comment argues that the SJC’s decision in Boston Gas Everett III 
was rooted more in equitable and policy considerations than legal analysis.22 In 
adopting the pro-rata approach, the SJC hoped to promote judicial economy by 
reducing the amount of indemnification litigation stemming from long-tail in-
juries in Massachusetts.23 The First Circuit’s subsequent decision in Boston 
Gas Commercial Point II shows that the court will afford the district courts 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Michael G. Doherty, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability Among Successive Insurance Poli-
cies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 257 (1997); see General Information about MGPs, supra note 9 (noting 
that during decades of operation, many MGPs leaked substantial amounts of contaminants). 
 15 Doherty, supra note 14, at 257. 
 16 Injuries that occur completely outside the temporal scope of insurance policies do not trigger 
their coverage. Thus, in long-tail claims, insurance companies have an incentive to prove that an envi-
ronmental injury occurred, in its entirety, outside the policy period. See Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. 
Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that the insured will not be covered if harm devel-
ops and manifests outside the policy period). 
 17 See Doherty, supra note 14, at 257–58 (explaining that uncertainty regarding which insurer will 
be liable for damage reduces settlement incentives and increases litigation costs). 
 18 Boston Gas Commercial Point II, 708 F.3d at 261 (quoting Doherty, supra note 14, at 257). 
 19 Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co. (Boston Gas Everett III), 910 N.E.2d 290, 301 (Mass. 
2009) (quoting Doherty, supra note 14, at 258). 
 20 Id. at 293, 312. 
 21 708 F.3d at 258. 
 22 See infra notes 82–115 and accompanying text. 
 23 See Boston Gas Everett III, 910 N.E.2d at 311 (noting that the joint and several method in-
creases litigation by encouraging subsequent contribution lawsuits between insurers). 
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broad discretion in allocating liability based on time-on-the-risk.24 Thus, the 
SJC’s hope is likely to be realized, but it remains to be seen whether these ben-
efits come at the cost of a reduction in private resources available for environ-
mental remediation.25 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1995, an inspection revealed contamination at Boston Gas’s former 
MGP site in Everett, Massachusetts.26 Around that time, contamination was 
found at a number of other Boston Gas sites, including Commercial Point in 
Dorchester.27 Boston Gas was strictly liable under Massachusetts law for all 
costs associated with the cleanup of the contamination at the two sites.28 In 
accordance with the Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Pre-
vention Act (“Chapter 21E”), Boston Gas was required to pay investigation 
and cleanup costs around the Commercial Point site.29 
Between 1951 and 1969, Boston Gas’s MGPs were insured through Cen-
tury with three different comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance poli-
cies.30 CGL policies are standard form liability insurance agreements that in-
sure companies for a broad range of liabilities.31 Like most CGL policies, Cen-
tury’s agreed to indemnify Boston Gas for “the sum actually paid in cash in the 
settlement or satisfaction of losses for which [Boston Gas] is liable” stemming 
from “an accident happening during the policy period or a continuous or re-
peated exposure to conditions which unexpectedly and unintentionally causes 
injury to or destruction of property during the policy period.”32 After the dis-
covery of contamination, Boston Gas put Century on notice that it might ask 
Century to indemnify the costs of the cleanup.33 Century responded by reserv-
                                                                                                                           
 24 See 708 F.3d at 258 (quoting Boston Gas Everett III, 910 N.E.2d at 316) (noting that the court 
would defer to the trial judge’s determination of allocation given the factual complexities of such 
cases). 
 25 See infra notes 110–115 and accompanying text. 
 26 Boston Gas Everett II, 529 F.3d at 11. 
 27 See Boston Gas Commercial Point II, 708 F.3d at 257. 
 28 See Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
21E § 5 (2006) (noting that the owner of a vessel that has released hazardous material “shall be liable, 
without regard to fault”). 
 29 Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant Boston Gas Co. at 7, Boston Gas Commercial Point II, 708 
F.3d 254 (No. 11-1931). 
 30 Id. at 8. 
 31 See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Splitting the Baby: Apportioning Environmental Liability Among 
Triggered Insurance Policies, 4 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1215, 1221 (1999) (noting that CGL policies were 
touted “as meeting a business’s entire insurance needs under . . . a single policy”). 
 32 Boston Gas Everett III, 910 N.E.2d at 295. 
 33 Boston Gas Everett II, 529 F.3d at 11. 
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ing its rights,34 which signaled that it intended to challenge the claim.35 On 
October 22, 2002, Boston Gas sued Century and sought a declaratory judgment 
confirming Century’s indemnification responsibilities under the policies.36 
The dispute arising out of the Everett site was the first to go to trial—
Boston Gas argued that Century was jointly and severally liable for the entire 
cost of the cleanup if any of the environmental injury occurred during Centu-
ry’s policy period.37 Thus, Boston Gas tried to prove at trial that the contami-
nation was ongoing, virtually from the day that the MGP opened to the time of 
litigation.38 Boston Gas was successful in both of these arguments.39 The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts found Century liable and 
awarded Boston Gas $6,227,327.90 in damages for the expenses it had in-
curred during the cleanup of the environmental contamination.40 In a post-trial 
motion, Century requested that the district court certify the allocation question 
to the SJC.41 The district court denied the request and entered a separate and 
final judgment.42 
Century appealed and challenged the district court’s application of the 
joint and several allocation method.43 Century argued that it should not have 
been liable for the entire cost of the remediation.44 Specifically, Century con-
tended that the joint and several approach was not the proper method for allo-
cating liability in long-term environmental contamination suits where the CGL 
insurer had provided coverage for the risk for only a portion of the time during 
which the contamination took place.45 Noting Century’s motion for certifica-
tion at the district court level, the First Circuit certified the question to the 
SJC.46 
                                                                                                                           
 34 When an insurance company sends a reservation of rights letter to a policy holder, the letter 
serves as a notice of the insurer’s intention not to waive its contractual rights to contest coverage or to 
apply an exclusion that negates an insured’s claim. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (9th ed. 2009). 
 35 Boston Gas Everett II, 529 F.3d at 11. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co. (Boston Gas Everett I), No. 02-12062-RZW, 2006 
WL 1738312, at *1 (D. Mass June 21, 2006) (noting that the court adopted the “all sums” approach 
that Boston Gas favored). 
 38 See Boston Gas Commercial Point II, 708 F.3d at 258–59 (noting that the court decided that 
Boston Gas would be held to its argument that the damage was constant through the life of the plant). 
 39 Id. at 259, 261. 
 40 Boston Gas Everett II, 529 F.3d at 12. 
 41 Century Indem. Co.’s Motion to Certify the Question of Allocation to the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court at 1, Boston Gas Everett I, 2006 WL 1738312 (No. 02-12062-RWZ). 
 42 Boston Gas Everett I, 2006 WL 1738312, at *2. 
 43 Boston Gas Everett II, 529 F.3d at 12. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 13. 
 46 Id. at 13 n.5; Order for the Certification of Questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, Boston Gas Everett II, 529 F.3d 8 (No. 07-1452). 
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The SJC adopted the pro-rata approach.47 The court held that the pre-
ferred method for allocating damages on a pro-rata basis is a fact-based deter-
mination of the losses occurring during the individual policy periods.48 The 
court further held that if such a factual determination is impossible, liability 
should be allocated based on the insurer’s time-on-the-risk.49 Time-on-the-risk 
allocation takes the entire amount of damages and divides it among insurers 
based on the length of their policy.50 In light of the SJC’s decision, the First 
Circuit remanded to the trial judge, who found that a pro-rata allocation could 
not be determined by the jury’s factual determination, and new trial was or-
dered.51 The case subsequently settled.52 
While the trial and appeal of the Everett case was taking place, the Com-
mercial Point case had gone to trial.53 Boston Gas and Century offered essen-
tially the same arguments that they advanced in the Everett litigation.54 The 
jury returned a verdict finding that Century was obligated to indemnify Boston 
Gas for the $1,699,145 cost of the investigation and remediation.55 The trial 
judge, however, did not enter a judgment prior to the SJC’s ruling on alloca-
tion.56 
Century, upon learning of the SJC’s adoption of the pro-rata approach, 
moved for judgment in its favor regarding the allocation.57 Century requested 
that the damage figure be spread equally from 1886 through 2007, the entire 
lifetime of the plant, based on the time-on-the-risk method.58 The trial court 
allocated the damages evenly across the 121-year period.59 This had the effect 
of reducing Century’s liability from just under $1.7 million to slightly more 
than $250,000.60 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Boston Gas Everett III, 910 N.E.2d at 312. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 316. 
 50 Id. (quoting Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 941 (Colo. 1999)). 
 51 Boston Gas Commercial Point II, 708 F.3d at 258. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See id. at 261 (noting that Boston Gas was successful in arguing that contamination was con-
tinuous throughout the MGP’s operation). 
 55 Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co. (Boston Gas Commercial Point I), 793 F. Supp. 2d 511, 
516 (D. Mass. 2011). 
 56 Id. at 514. 
 57 Boston Gas Commercial Point II, 708 F.3d at 258. 
 58 Id. at 259. 
 59 See Boston Gas Commercial Point I, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (deciding that Boston Gas, despite 
its incentive to argue otherwise, was bound by its argument that the site’s contamination was ongoing 
from the plant’s opening in 1886 to the time of trial in 2007). 
 60 See Boston Gas Commercial Point II, 708 F.3d at 259 (explaining that this decision reduced 
Century’s liability from 100% of the nearly $1.7 million damages to 15% of the damages). 
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On appeal, the First Circuit upheld the trial judge’s determination.61 It 
reasoned that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the 
verdict could not serve as a basis for a fact-based allocation.62 Thus, Boston 
Gas’s trial arguments prior to the SJC’s alteration of the allocation law in Mas-
sachusetts decreased Century’s liability from 100% of the damages to less than 
15%.63 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act 
(“Chapter 21E”) authorizes the Massachusetts Department of Environmental 
Protection to order a potentially responsible party to clean up a contaminated 
site.64 By imposing retroactive liability, Chapter 21E and similar laws “mark[] 
a major commitment . . . to clean up the life-threatening reside of the now 
waning industrial age.”65 The retroactive liabilities that stem from environmen-
tal cleanup costs, however, present challenges when they are fit into existing 
insurance models.66 Courts remain divided on the question of how to allocate 
indemnity liability between insurers on the risk in long-tail claims.67 
The 1981 case of Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America is con-
sidered the seminal case embracing joint and several liability for insurers.68 
There, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that each insurer 
was jointly and severally liable for the entire indemnity costs of asbestos-
related lawsuits.69 Thus, the insured could pick one from all of its triggered 
policies (generally the largest) to indemnify it up to the policy’s limits, and that 
insurer could then seek contribution from the issuers of other triggered polic-
es.70 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id. at 258. 
 62 Id. at 260. 
 63 Id. at 259. 
 64 Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21E 
§ 5 (2006). 
 65 Peter K. Johnson, Mr. Smith Goes to Washington: 1997 Superfund Amendments, Will It Solve 
the Liability Problem and How Will This Affect Massachusetts?, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1269, 1270 
(1997). 
 66 See Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co. (Boston Gas Everett II), 529 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 
2008) (citing William R. Hickman & Mary R. DeYoung, Allocation of Environmental Cleanup Liabil-
ity Between Successive Insurers, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 291, 292 (1990)) (noting that the language of CGL 
policies “does not neatly map onto these types of injuries”). 
 67 See infra notes 76, 83 and accompanying text. 
 68 EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 934 A.2d 517, 521–22 
(N.H. 2007) (citing Bass, supra note 13, at 269). 
 69 Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 70 See id. (noting that issuers of triggered policies will be liable for the whole amount, but contri-
bution actions among other insurers may keep the single insurer from being “saddled with full liability 
for any injury”). 
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Focusing on the plain language of the insurance contract, the Keene court 
found that the scope of the coverage clause required coverage for “all sums” 
that the insured must pay because of property damage, even if property dam-
age persists beyond the policy period.71 The court reasoned that policies con-
tain a “built-in trigger of coverage” that cover the policy holder’s entire liabil-
ity once triggered.72 “There is nothing in the policies that provides for a reduc-
tion of the insurer’s liability if an injury occurs only in part during a policy 
period.”73 Although Keene was decided in the context of asbestos-related liti-
gation, the supreme courts of six states have followed the D.C. Circuit’s lead 
and adopted the joint and several approach in the context of long-tail environ-
mental injury cases.74 
Courts that have rejected the joint and several approach in favor of the 
pro-rata allocation method analyze the relationship between the trigger and 
scope of coverage clauses differently.75 These courts take the view that when 
the two clauses are read in the context of the whole policy, the time limitation 
in the trigger clause (“during the policy period”) applies to the scope of the 
coverage.76 Thus, the scope of the policy’s coverage only extends to the clean-
up costs for property damage that is deemed to have arisen during the policy 
period.77 
Prior to Massachusetts’s adoption of the pro-rata approach, ten other state 
high courts had done the same.78 The New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted 
the pro-rata approach in EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc., v. Certain Underwrit-
ers at Lloyd’s.79 The EnergyNorth court based its decision almost entirely on 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id. at 1047. 
 72 Id. at 1048. 
 73 Id. 
 74 California, Ohio, Delaware, Indiana, Washington, and Pennsylvania have all adopted the joint 
and several approach. See State v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 281 P.3d 1000, 1008 (Cal. 2012); Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 769 N.E.2d 835, 841 (Ohio 2002); Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Ins. 
Co., 784 A.2d 481, 491 (Del. 2001); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1058 (Ind. 
2001); Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. B & L Trucking & Constr. Co., 951 P.2d 250, 256 (Wash. 1998); 
J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. 1993). 
 75 See infra notes 91–98 and accompanying text. 
 76 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687, 695 (N.Y. 2002). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Louisiana, Vermont, New Hampshire, Kentucky, Connecticut, New York, Colorado, Minneso-
ta, Utah, and New Jersey have all adopted the pro-rata approach. See S. Silica of La., Inc. v. La. Ins. 
Guar. Ass’n, 979 So. 2d 460, 468 (La. 2008); Towns v. N. Sec. Ins. Co., 964 A.2d 1150, 1167 (Vt. 
2008); EnergyNorth, 934 A.2d at 526; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 S.W.3d 830, 842 (Ky. 
2005); Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 826 A.2d 107, 121 (Conn. 2003); 
Consol. Edison, 774 N.E.2d at 695; Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 935 (Co-
lo. 1999); Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 732–33 (Minn. 1997); Sharon Steel 
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 141–42 (Utah 1997); see also Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. 
United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 995 (N.J. 1994) (deciding that an allocation method must account for 
“time on the risk and degree of risk assumed”). 
 79 934 A.2d at 526. 
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policy objectives including, “(1) maximizing resources to cope with environ-
mental injury or damage; (2) giving the greatest incentive to insureds to ac-
quire insurance; and (3) achieving simple justice.”80 The court voiced particu-
lar concern that adoption of the joint and several method would encourage en-
vironmental carelessness on the part of actors who choose not to be insured for 
part of a long-tail injury period.81 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indemnity (Boston Gas Everett III), the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) adopted the pro-rata allocation 
method in the context of long-tail environmental injury indemnification suits.82 
According to the SJC, Massachusetts courts now “determine precisely what 
injury or damage took place during each contract period or uninsured period 
and allocate the losses accordingly.”83 If such a fact-based allocation is impos-
sible, courts are to assign liability based on the insurer’s or uninsured’s time-
on-the-risk.84 As a result of the new rule, comprehensive general liability 
(CGL) policy issuers will likely see their liability for long-tail environmental 
injuries reduced greatly because liability for injury resulting outside the tem-
poral scope of their policies is placed on the insured.85 
In reaching this decision, the SJC followed the reasoning of the court in 
EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc., v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s and found 
the language of the policy that declared “this policy applies to . . . property 
damage . . . which occurs anywhere during the policy period” to be control-
ling.86 It found that that Boston Gas put “undue emphasis on the phrase ‘ulti-
mate net loss’” in arguing for the joint and several allocation and that “no rea-
sonable policyholder” could expect its insurance to indemnify for all damages 
that occurred outside its policy period.87 This reasoning is unpersuasive in light 
of the fact that multiple other state high courts applied joint and several alloca-
tion in cases where the indemnification policy contained the same form lan-
                                                                                                                           
 80 Id. at 525 (citing Benjamin Moore & Co. v. Aetna Cas., 843 A.2d 1094, 1101 (N.J. 2004)). 
 81 See id. at 526 (citing Bratspies, supra note 31, at 1236–38 (noting that under joint and several 
liability, companies might not have an incentive to insure at all times because they could recover fully 
if an injury occurs even in part during a period of coverage)). 
 82 Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co. (Boston Gas Everett III), 910 N.E.2d 290, 312 (Mass. 
2009). 
 83 Id. (quoting SCOTT M. SEAMAN & JASON R. SCHULTZE, ALLOCATION OF LOSSES IN COMPLEX 
INSURANCE COVERAGE CLAIMS § 4.3[b], at 4–18 (2nd ed. 2008)). 
 84 Id. at 314. 
 85 See Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co. (Boston Gas Commercial Point II), 708 F.3d 254, 
259 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that Century’s liability was reduced by eighty-five percent). 
 86 Boston Gas Everett III, 910 N.E.2d at 306–07 (citing EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 934 A.2d 517, 523 (N.H. 2007)). 
 87 Id. at 308–09 (emphasis added). 
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guage.88 This reasoning is further undermined by the fact that drafters of the 
standard form CGL policy consciously omitted pro-rata allocation clauses 
from the policy.89 At least one court has considered the absence of a pro-rata 
clause proof that insurers intended to be responsible for the insureds’ entire 
loss up to the policy limit.90 
Given than numerous courts had interpreted the same language and come 
to differing results, the court’s decision appeared to hinge primarily on equita-
ble considerations and policy rationales rather than contract interpretation.91 It 
noted that the “pro-rata allocation method promotes judicial efficiency, engen-
ders stability and predictability in the insurance market, provides incentive for 
responsible commercial behavior and produces an equitable result.”92 There 
should be healthy skepticism of some of the court’s policy rationales.93 While 
it is likely that the pro-rata approach will reduce litigation, there is scant evi-
dence that it will encourage more responsible commercial behavior.94 Further-
more, the pro-rata approach could have the effect of reducing private funding 
available for environmental remediation if responsible parties cannot pay the 
liabilities they expected to be covered by their CGL issuers.95 
The SJC noted that it believed the pro-rata approach would increase the 
incentive for commercial entities to purchase insurance rather than try to cut 
costs by going bare for periods in the hopes that their entire liability would be 
covered as long as one policy was triggered.96 However, this reasoning is un-
dermined by the fact that companies still have a great incentive to insure in 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 769 N.E.2d 835, 840–41 (Ohio 
2002) (applying joint and several allocation to a policy that defined property damage as “injury to or 
destruction of tangible property which occurs during the policy period”); State v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 281 
P.3d 1000, 1008 (Cal. 2012) (holding the same). 
 89 See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A2d 974, 990 (N.J. 1994) (quoting Gilbert L. 
Bean, a drafter of the CGL policy, as saying “there is no pro-ration formula in the policy, as it seemed 
impossible to develop a formula which would handle every possible situation with complete equity”). 
 90 See J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa. 1993) (noting that 
the CGL policy drafters failed to include pro-rata language despite contemplating that a progressive 
injury could trigger a policy if it occurred in part during the policy period). 
 91 See Boston Gas Everett III, 910 N.E.2d at 311 (supporting the court’s decision by noting that 
pro-rata allocation “also serves important public policy objectives”). The court, however, did not 
emphasize its policy rational as strongly as its New Jersey counterpart, which adopted pro-rata despite 
being “unable to find the answer to allocation in the language of the policies.” Owens-Illinois, 650 
A.2d at 990. 
 92 Boston Gas Everett III, 910 N.E.2d at 311. 
 93 See infra notes 99–115 and accompanying text. 
 94 See infra notes 99–115 and accompanying text. 
 95 See infra notes 99–115 and accompanying text; see also Christopher R. Hermann et al., The 
Unanswered Question of Environmental Insurance Allocation in Oregon Law, 39 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 1131, 1132 (2003) (noting that strict liability pollution statutes bankrupted some companies, 
while others were unable to fund the work required by the EPA or corresponding state analog). 
 96 See Boston Gas Everett III, 910 N.E.2d at 311 (quoting Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 992 (noting 
that joint and several allocation reduces the incentive to insure)). 
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case there is an injury that develops and manifests during a period of non-
coverage, such as an explosion that damages property or a pipe burst that leads 
to a large, instantaneous toxic leak.97 Furthermore, the notion that companies 
such as Boston Gas intentionally forwent insurance coverage for long periods 
before buying a CGL to cover costs of a long-tail injury is false, as many such 
long-tail injuries began before CGL polies were even issued.98 
The decision might also have an effect of reducing private funds available 
for remediation projects.99 It has been shown that the liabilities arising out of 
strict liability environmental statutes can make parties insolvent.100 Although 
the Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act (“Chap-
ter 21E”) has aggressive provisions to maximize private funding for remedia-
tion projects, it is possible that bankrupt companies will not be able to cover 
the entire cost of remediating long-tail injuries that began prior to the issuance 
of CGL policies.101 This undermines the SJC’s intention of maximizing re-
sources available for remediation.102 It should be noted, too, that the pro-rata 
scheme may also provide insureds the perverse incentive to conceal environ-
mental contamination for as long as possible to increase their policy issuer’s 
time on the risk—delaying important cleanup efforts and further exposing the 
public to toxics.103 
One of the policy rationales that will likely be served is a reduction in the 
amount of insurance indemnification litigation.104 In Boston Gas Co. v. Centu-
ry Indemnity (Boston Gas Commercial Point II), the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit’s first appeal relating to the newly announced pro-rata rule, the 
court upheld the trial judge’s determination to apply a time-on-the-risk alloca-
tion method to the verdict given by the jury.105 As seen in the Everett site liti-
gation, the judge could have just as easily ordered a retrial given the funda-
                                                                                                                           
 97 See Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting the 
notion that joint and several allocation promotes forgoing insurance coverage). 
 98 See Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 995. 
 99 See infra notes 110–115 and accompanying text. 
 100 See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Inc. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., 870 
P.2d 260, 263 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (wood treatment plant filing for bankruptcy); 229 Main St. Ltd. 
P’ship v. Commonwealth of Mass., Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 251 B.R. 186, 189 (D. Mass. 2000) (limited 
commercial real estate partnership filing for bankruptcy). 
 101 Chapter 21E § 13 contains a super lien provision that “is one of the tools provided by the stat-
ute to aid the Commonwealth in ensuring that cleanup is prompt and efficient.” Acme Laundry Co., 
Inc. v. Sec’y of Envtl. Aff., 575 N.E.2d 1086, 1090 (Mass. 1991). 
 102 See Boston Gas Everett III, 910 N.E.2d at 311 (quoting Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 992) 
(finding that joint and several would “reduce the available assets to manage the risk”). 
 103 Cf. Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co. (Boston Gas Commercial Point I), 793 F. Supp. 2d 
511, 519 (D. Mass. 2011) (noting insureds’ incentive to show that a larger portion of contamination 
occurred during the coverage period). 
 104 See Boston Gas Commercial Point II, 708 F.3d at 264 (upholding the trial court’s time-on-the-
risk allocation rather than ordering a new trial). 
 105 Id. 
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mental change in Massachusetts law on allocation.106 The court noted instead 
that the case was “precisely the sort of progressive environmental injury for 
which ‘it is both scientifically and administratively impossible to allocate to 
each policy the liability for injuries occurring only within its policy period’ and 
to which a time-on-the-risk calculation should therefore apply.”107 Thus, an-
other trial was avoided.108 Significant in this determination was the court’s rul-
ing that Boston Gas was judicially estopped from arguing on appeal that “the 
contamination was cabined in as narrow a period as possible (to maximize its 
recovery from Century).”109 
By affirming the trial court’s ruling rather than ordering a new trial in 
light of the change in the law of allocation, the First Circuit showed its will-
ingness to provide trial courts with broad discretion in determining issues of 
fact-based allocation.110 The First Circuit’s decision shows that time-on-the-
risk allocation can serve to conserve judicial resources by disposing of long-
tail indemnification cases where imperfect science could lead to further pro-
tracted litigation.111 The result of Boston Gas Commercial Point II was to shift 
eighty-five percent of Century’s liability to Boston Gas.112 Here, the insured 
party was a conglomerate with the resources to undertake and finish the reme-
diation despite having only a small fraction of those costs indemnified.113 It 
remains to be seen whether the resources available for environmental cleanups 
are lessened as responsible parties become insolvent as a result of their drasti-
cally increased liability.114 At the end of the day, the only guaranteed winners 
will be the court dockets whose burdens are lessened by reduction of litigation 
resulting from the lack of clarity and the insurance companies, whose liabili-
ties will reduce drastically.115 
CONCLUSION 
In Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indemnity (Boston Gas Everett III), the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted the pro-rata approach to insur-
                                                                                                                           
 106 See id. at 258 (noting that the Everett case was ordered to be retried in light of the SJC ruling). 
 107 Id. at 261 (quoting Boston Gas Everett III, 910 N.E.2d at 301). 
 108 Id. at 264. 
 109 Id. at 263 (quoting Boston Gas Commercial Point I, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 519). 
 110 See id. at 259 (quoting Guay v. Burack, 677 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 2012)) (noting that “[under] 
the abuse of discretion standard, we will not lightly substitute our judgment for that of the district 
court, and will reverse only if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the court below 
committed a clear error of judgment”). 
 111 See id. at 259–60 (upholding the district court’s decision not to retry the case). 
 112 Id. at 259. 
 113 See Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co. (Boston Gas Everett II), 529 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 
2008) (noting that Boston Gas sought indemnity from Century after paying remediation costs); supra 
note 4 and accompanying text. 
 114 See Hermann et al., supra note 95. 
 115 See supra notes 105–109 and accompanying text. 
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ance indemnification litigation. Subsequently, in Boston Gas Co. v. Century 
Indemnity (Boston Gas Commercial Point II), the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit showed its willingness to allow the district courts broad dis-
cretion in applying pro-rata allocation to long-tail claims. The decisions likely 
will serve an important goal of reducing the burden that indemnification litiga-
tion puts on court dockets. Hopefully the decisions will not prove to lessen the 
private resources available for environmental cleanup projects. 
 
Preferred Citation: Benjamin S. Reilly, Comment, Pro-Rata Apportionment in “Long-Tail” Con-
tamination Cases: Will Presumed Efficiencies Undercut Environmental Cleanups?, 41 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. E. SUPP. 91 (2014), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol41/iss3/. 
